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Abstract  
In the context of increasing water scarcity, understanding is growing that irrigation water rights are 
important and that a lack of effective water rights systems constitute a major reason for inefficient 
water management. This study carried out a contingent ranking experiment to study how smallholder 
irrigators in South Africa would value potential changes in water rights. Three specific dimensions of 
water rights, relevant for the South African case, are considered: duration, quality of title and 
transferability. Results indicate that smallholder irrigators are prepared to pay considerably higher 
water prices if improvements are made in the water rights system. This implies that the proposed 
interventions in the water rights system would improve the efficiency and productivity of the small-
scale irrigation sector. The increased willingness to pay could furthermore also assist South African 
government to reach the objective of increased cost recovery.  
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 Introduction 
There is general agreement that if property rights are ill-defined, this can seriously impair the 
efficient use of natural resources (Randall, 1978; Ostrom, 2000; Heltberg, 2002; Linde-Rahr, 2008). 
As indicated by Challen (2000), this is linked to the transaction costs associated with the making of 
decisions over the use of the resource. When property rights are ill-defined, this creates high 
transaction costs, limits the value people assign to a resource and confines the incentives for resource 
users to manage a resource sustainably. Improvements in the property rights system for a resource 
will increase the willingness to pay (WTP) by the resource users for its use because transaction costs 
are reduced (Herrera et al., 2004; Frija et al., 2008) or investments made more profitable (Bruns, 
2003). Therefore sub-optimal property right systems constitute a form of inefficiency, which can be 
revealed by measuring WTP for improvements in their definition. Based on this some authors (e.g., 
Herrera et al., 2004; Frija et al., 2008; Linde-Rahr, 2008) have recently used classic contingent 
valuation methods for the evaluation of the degree of the efficiency of a prevailing property right 
structure.  
 
As an alternative, this study proposes to use contingent ranking (CR), a form of choice modeling. CR 
is a survey-based technique for modeling preferences for goods, where goods are described in terms 
of their attributes and the level these take. Respondents are presented with alternative descriptions of 
a good, differentiated by their attribute levels, and are asked to rank the alternatives. By including 
price as one of the attributes, WTP can be indirectly calculated from people’s rankings (Hanley et al., 
2001; Street et al., 2005). Recently choice modeling has often been used to value environmental 
programs because such programs typically consist of several components and the technique enables 
to value not only an intervention as a whole, but also its various components (see Hanley et al., 2001; 
Bateman et al., 2006; Hanley et al., 2006; Burton, 2007). People’s WTP for the individual 
components of an intervention can thus be provided. In our study we use this feature of the method to 
separately value several water right dimensions. As indicated by Rigby et al. (2010), this would be 
difficult to do in a CV study. Another advantage of CR is the avoidance of an explicit elicitation of 
respondents’ WTP by relying instead on the ranking of a series of alternative packages of 
characteristics (Foster and Mourato, 2002; Bateman et al., 2006). Compared with ordinary choice 
experiments, CR is a relative informational efficient method, with the gains in estimation efficiency 
yielding significantly narrower confidence intervals on derived WTP measures, thus enhancing the 
reliability of the mean WTP estimates (MacKenzie, 1993; Holmes and Adamowicz, 2003; Alriksson 
and Öberg, 2008). Possible problems in using the method are the complex nature of the statistical 
design, the selection of the appropriate attributes and levels and the cognitive difficulty associated 
with ranking choices (Hanley et al., 1998, 2001). Finally it should be noted that the method relies on 
a hypothetical ranking and not on observed behavior.   
 
In this study we use CR to economically value the benefits of improvements in the definition of the 
current water rights system in South Africa, focusing on smallholder irrigators. Because like 
environmental programs, water rights interventions usually consist of several components, e.g. 
changes in transferability, duration or enforcement, CR is an interesting method. In South Africa the 
National Water Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998) formally replaced the previous system of water 
rights and entitlements, which were based on the ownership of riparian land, with a new system of 
administrative limited-period and conditional authorizations to use water (Nieuwoudt, 2002). 
However, various aspects of this new water rights system have already been criticized. It is therefore 
relevant to study potential improvements in the system. Moreover, given their apparent low 
efficiency of water use (Speelman et al., 2008a), the problems of cost-recovery of government 
investments in these schemes (Perret and Geyser, 2007; Backeberg, 2006) and their political 
importance a focus on smallholder irrigators is appropriate in the South African context. On one hand 
the improvements in the definition of water rights can stimulate smallholders to use water more 
productively, encouraging cooperation and investment (Bruns, 2003, 2007); on the other hand 
government can benefit from the higher willingness to pay for water by charging higher water prices 
and thus improve cost recovery (Virjee and Gaskin, 2005).  
 
Methodology 
Analytical Framework 
The econometric analysis of data collected from a CR experiment is based on McFadden’s 
conditional logit model, which is grounded in the random utility framework (McFadden, 1974). This 
is presented in Equation (1). 
 
Uij = b (Xij, Zi) + εij         (1) 
 
Here Uij is the utility a person i receives from choosing alternative j. This can be  decomposed in two 
parts: an observable element b(Xij, Zi), which describes the preferences of person i as a function of 
the attributes of the alternatives presented to the individual (Xij) and the characteristics of the 
individuals (Zi) and secondly a stochastic element (εij), which represents those influences on 
individual choice that cannot be observed by the researcher (Foster and Mourato, 1997; Blamey et al., 
1999).  
 
Typically it is assumed that the εij are independently and identically distributed with an extreme-value 
(Weibull) distribution, resulting in a conditional logit model. The probability of one option being 
chosen over another can be written as in Equation (2) 
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The conditional logit model only allows the identification of the most preferred alternative and does 
not fully exploit all the information contained in the CR experiment. Beggs et al. (1981) therefore 
developed an extension to the basic conditional logit model, which is capable of not only identifying 
the most preferred alternative but also the exact ordinal ranking of all of the remaining elements. This 
model is known as the rank-ordered logit model. The rank-ordered logit model relies on the repeated 
application of the conditional logit specification to the set of alternatives remaining after successive 
first choices have been eliminated from the available options (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999; Foster 
and Mourato, 2002). Recent applications of the rank-ordered logit model in other fields include 
studies by Nixon et al. (2009) and Paudel et al. (2007). In the model the probability of obtaining a 
particular ranking can be expressed as shown in Equation (3) (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999).  
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The model in Equation (3) does not allow preferences to vary across individuals in accordance with 
their socio-economic characteristics. Individual specific variables can however be entered in the 
utility function in interaction form with attributes that change across the alternatives to be ranked 
(Foster and Mourato, 1997; Blamey et al., 1999). The coefficients obtained for these interaction terms 
permit to evaluate the effect of socio-economic characteristics on the ranking. 
 
Once the parameter estimates have been obtained, the WTP can be derived for each attribute (Hanley 
et al., 2001). When it is assumed that utility is a linear function of the attribute levels like in Equation 
(1), WTP can simply be expressed as in Equation (4): 
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where by is the coefficient of the cost attribute and bc is the coefficient of any of the attributes. 
Equation 4 corresponds with the marginal rate of substitution between the price attribute and the 
other attribute in the equation and is called the implicit price.  
 
Application of the contingent ranking experiment 
Typically the design of a choice experiment involves a number of key stages (Hanley et al., 1998; 
Bennett and Adamowicz, 2001; Holmes and Adamowicz, 2003). First the problem at hand has to be 
clearly characterized. Then the attributes and their levels should be chosen. Researchers must be 
careful that the attribute space is constructed such that it is relevant for the policy questions being 
asked. Finally, experimental design procedures are used to construct the choice tasks that will be 
presented to the respondents. The next paragraphs discuss the implementation of these steps for this 
study. 
 
Characterization of the problem  
Internationally there is growing understanding that water rights are important and that a lack of 
effective water rights systems creates major problems for the management of increasingly scarce 
water supplies (Matthews, 2004; Bruns et al., 2005a). Nevertheless, better information is needed on 
the gains of changes in water rights systems (Bruns, 2003). This study evaluates the recently revised 
water rights system in South Africa, with specific reference to smallholder irrigators. The system now 
legally consists of administrative limited-period and conditional authorizations to use water, which 
are called licenses (Nieuwoudt, 2002). Except for the fundamental right of access to water for basic 
human needs, all other water uses require a licence (Stein, 2005). The issuing of licenses to existing 
and potential new water uses is an ongoing process in South Africa and licenses are introduced 
gradually in the different parts of the country depending on the degree of water scarcity (DWAF, 
2004). In practice the responsible water management authority issues a notice calling for license 
applications, after which users and prospective users should prepare and submit such applications. In 
theory the Catchment Management Agency (CMA) will be responsible for authorizing water use, 
however till the CMA is fully operational regional offices of the Department of Water Affairs 
(DWAF) are entrusted with this task. The licenses in South Africa have following characteristics 
(DWAF, 2004): 
- they are specific to the user to whom they are issued and to a particular property or area; 
- they are specific to the use or uses for which they are issued; 
- they are valid for a specified time period, which may not exceed 40 years;  
- a range of conditions can be attached to the license (conditions can refer for example to the 
volumes and timing of abstractions, the volume that may be stored etc…) and 
- they must be reviewed by the responsible authority at least every five years. 
Several aspects of this new water rights system have already been criticized. Based on farmers 
opinions Backeberg (2006) for instance discussed the negative effect of the short review period of the 
licenses on the investment decisions of farmers, while Nieuwoudt and Armitage (2004) pointed out 
that the reliability of allocations is highly variable since no assurance of supply or quality is given. 
Louw and Van Schalkwyk (2002) warned that, for trade in water rights to be potentially successful, 
transaction costs should be kept low, which might not be the case under the current conditions. Given 
the reported problems it is therefore relevant to investigate where changes in the system are required 
and which changes would have the largest impact.  
 
Design of the attribute space 
An influential approach to analyze rights to natural resources categorizes six dimensions: duration, 
exclusivity, quality of title, flexibility, transferability and divisibility of rights (Scott, 1989). Such 
subdivision highlights how attributes of rights may be adjusted separately along various dimensions, 
specifying rights (and implicitly leaving other attributes of rights undefined). As was shown by 
Challen (2000), Bruns (2006) and Crase and Dollery (2006), this deconstruction can also be applied 
to water rights. In this work the definition of Crase and Dollery (2006) for the six dimensions is used: 
Duration is used to represent the period of the rights. Exclusivity describes the extent to which others 
can be prevented from accessing the item/resource or enjoying the benefits that flow from it. The 
transferability dimension encapsulates the ease with which a right may be passed to others. 
Divisibility depicts the degree to which the right can be subdivided and flexibility defines the extent 
to which the right permits an alteration to the pattern of use. Finally, the quality of title attribute 
encompasses the capacity of the title to adequately describe the resource or item. 
From these six dimensions only the most relevant for the case of South Africa were included in order 
to keep the size of the CR experiment within manageable proportions. Based on literature review and 
expert knowledge duration, transferability and quality of title were selected because some degree of 
attenuation is reported for these dimensions (see Perret, 2002; Nieuwoudt, 2002; Louw and Van 
Schalkwyk, 2002; Nieuwoudt and Armitage, 2004; Gillit et al., 2005; Backeberg, 2006; Pott et al., 
2009). It is hereby assumed that the fact that there is no criticism on the other dimensions implies that 
these at present are already fairly efficient and that changing them therefore is not a policy priority.   
 In terms of duration the National Water Resources Strategy Paper of South Africa (DWAF, 2004) 
foresees a water license with a specified duration of maximum 40 years. However, this license has to 
be evaluated at least every 5 years. At each evaluation conditions attached to licenses may change. 
This procedure should allow the government to take timely measures to maintain the integrity of the 
water resource, achieve a balance between available water and water requirements, or accommodate 
changes in water use priorities (DWAF, 2004) This 5-yearly revision will clearly influence 
investment decisions of farmers, as they might perceive licenses to be insecure (Nieuwoudt and 
Armitage, 2004; Backeberg, 2006). Levels for the duration in this study are therefore set at 5 years, 
which is considered as base situation, and 10 years. The 10 years level was chosen here because this 
is considered long enough not to deter most investments, while still allowing government to respond 
relatively quickly to changing circumstances. 
 
Transferable water rights and water markets are believed to improve water productivity because they 
induce transfers of water to users with the highest marginal return (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; 
Easter et al., 1998; Nieuwoudt and Armitage, 2004; Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 2005; Gillit et al., 
2005; Zekri and Easter, 2007). In South Africa in the National Water Act provisions are made 
regarding transferability, it is stated that permanent transfers, constituting trade in water licenses, will 
be subject to all requirements for license applications. This means that the Catchment Management 
Agency has to approve every transfer. One of the criteria that will be used in the evaluation is that a 
balance should be maintained between the interest of the parties involved in the trade and the general 
public interest (DWAF, 2004). For transfers of water rights among irrigators in a same irrigation 
scheme this type of administrative procedure seems to create unnecessary transaction costs and 
insecurity. Rosegrant et al. (1995), Shi (2006) and Donohew (2009) point out that this type of 
overregulation will limit efficiency gains from water transfer. In addition, legislation is not very clear 
about the timing of the introduction of trade in water licenses (Perret, 2002; Backeberg, 2006). It was 
therefore also considered relevant to include the current situation where water rights are not 
transferable as base option in the experiment. This results in three levels regarding transferability 
being introduced in the experiment: no possibility to transfer, administrative transfer and market 
transfer. 
 
The dimension of quality of title encompasses the capacity of the title to adequately describe a 
resource or an item. In this respect an important aspect of the water licenses in South Africa is that 
although quantities will be specified in the license, they are not guaranteed (Republic of South Africa, 
1998); this clearly decreases the reliability of the water allocations (Nieuwoudt and Armitage, 2004). 
For this dimension therefore non-guaranteed and guaranteed supply were chosen as levels in this 
study. 
 
Finally, to be able to economically value the considered attribute changes, a payment vehicle has to 
be included. Here we use the unit price of water (R/m³) to evaluate respondent’s willingness to pay 
for the changes in the different attributes. The price attribute is set at three levels 0.06 R/m³, 0.09 
R/m³ and 0.12 R/m³. Average exchange rate at the time of data collection was 1Rand= 0.13 US$. The 
price of 0.06 R/m³ corresponds to the order of magnitude of the water prices in the study area 
(DWAF, 2008b; DWAF, 2008c). Because it is expected that the value attached to the improvements 
will only capture part of the value of water, the range is also well below most estimations of the 
productive value of water, which usually is more than 0.5 R/m³ (Speelman et al., 2008b). Table 1 
provides an overview of the attributes and attribute levels considered.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Design of the ranking sets  
All possible combinations of four attributes, two with two different levels and two with three 
different levels produce 36 water right definitions. This is called a full factorial design. Clearly, it 
would not be feasible to ask respondents to rank the full set of 36 options from most to least 
preferred. Consequently, it was necessary to find some means of grouping the options into smaller 
sets (Foster and Mourato, 1997; Bennet and Adamowicz, 2001; Alriksson and Öberg, 2008). This 
was done in three stages as described below and illustrated in figure 1. 
 INSERT FIGURE 6.1 ABOUT HERE 
 
In the first stage an orthogonal design was constructed using the Orthoplan-function in SPSS. Such 
orthogonal design allows isolating the effects of individual attributes on the choice, also called the 
main effects. This ability to “design in” orthogonality is an important advantage over revealed 
preference random utility models, where attributes in reality are often found to be highly correlated 
with each other. In our case the orthogonal design resulted in nine options.  
Because ranking nine options was still considered a difficult task, it was decided to limit the number 
of options to be ranked against each other to four. To construct an optimal design with a set of four 
options a procedure developed by Street et al. (2005) is used. This design procedure results in a 
design with desirable structural properties such as minimum attribute-level overlap and balance, 
allowing more information to be gathered from the same sample (Burgess and Street, 2005; Street et 
al., 2005). Because of these properties the technique has proved to always give an optimal or near-
optimal design for the estimation of main effects, and near-optimal designs for the estimation of main 
effects plus two-factor interaction effects. The basic idea of the construction technique is simple: the 
options from the orthogonal design will represent the first option in the choice sets; then a systematic 
set of level changes is applied to obtain the second option in the choice sets; and another systematic 
set of changes is applied to get the third option, and so on. In this way, starting from the orthogonal 
design, nine choice sets with four options in each of them were obtained. The resulting designs are 
optimal because they have a maximum determinant for the Fisher information matrix. This 
characteristic is called D-optimality. For more into depth information regarding the design technique 
see Burgess and Street (2005) or Street et al. (2005). Following Holmes and Adamowicz (2003), it 
was decided to divide the choice sets in blocks to avoid the respondents’ fatigue effect, which could 
cause consistency to decrease. Each respondent is then assigned randomly to a particular block. This 
resulted in three blocks with three choice sets in each. Finally, because part of the respondent 
population was expected to be illiterate, a graphical representation of the attribute levels was used. 
An example of a choice set is presented in figure 2. Because the purpose of this study is to value 
improvements in a functioning system, in the choice sets no classic “no choice” option was included. 
Farmers are currently operating under what can be called a base scenario. The base scenario 
corresponds to the situation where the price is at the lowest level, duration is 5 years, supply is not 
guaranteed and licenses are not transferable. Each choice set contains at least one option, which is 
dominant to this base level with price at the lowest level but one or more of the other attributes at 
improved levels. The studies by Blamey et al. (1999), Foster and Mourato (2002), Hanley et al. 
(2006) and Bateman et al. (2006) are other examples of research where the classic “no choice” option 
is not included, because possible improvements made to some kind of base scenario of a system are 
studied. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Data collection  
The data were collected in April 2008 in the Limpopo province of South Africa. This is the province 
with about 60% of all smallholder schemes (Denison, 2006). Two regions, where clusters of 
smallholder irrigation schemes are located were selected: the region around Mafefe and the region 
around Trichardtsdal (figure 3). Although geographically close to each other these regions are 
separated by an embranchment of the Drakensbergen mountain range. The difference in cropping 
patterns between the regions reflects the difference in degree of water scarcity. Within these regions 
seven irrigation schemes were identified from the national database of small-scale irrigation schemes 
(Denison, 2006). Both larger irrigation schemes with over 100 farmers and smaller schemes with only 
30-40 farmers were included in the sample. In this way a sample typifying the situation of 
smallholder irrigation schemes in the rural areas of South Africa was established.  
 
INSERT FIGURE .3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Contacts with the scheme management were made through the agricultural extension services 
responsible for the schemes. These services also provided a list of all active farmers on the schemes 
and background information regarding each individual scheme. From the lists, about 30% of the 
farmers were randomly selected. These farmers were then contacted through scheme management or 
traditional authorities and all selected farmers were prepared to collaborate. A team of enumerators 
consisting of PhD and Master students from Limpopo University in Polokwane was trained to 
conduct the interviews. During the training there was also one day of pre-testing of the questionnaire. 
Farmers were interviewed on field. Before starting the questionnaire the purpose of the study was 
explained and respondents were given information regarding the actual water rights system. In a 
stepwise manner, they were made familiar with the graphical representation of the attribute levels 
included in the CR experiment. The questionnaires included not only the CR experiment, but also 
detailed information regarding farming activities, alternative income sources and institutional aspects 
of water management. Table 2 gives an overview of some of the respondent specific variables 
included in the analysis. In total 138 farmers were interviewed, but only 134 questionnaires were 
completed and could be included in the analyses. These 134 questionnaires provided 402 completed 
choice sets for analysis.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE  
 Results and discussion 
Socio-economic characteristics of sample population  
Detailed information regarding irrigation activities, income sources and institutional aspects of water 
management was collected. The findings in this section are very similar to that of other studies on 
smallholder irrigation schemes in South Africa (e.g. Perret, 2002; Van Averbeke and Mohamed, 
2007; Hope et al., 2008). This supports our claim that the selected schemes and respondents are 
typical for the South African context. The average age of the farmers is 58 years, indicating that 
farming population at this type of irrigation schemes is aging. The average number of years of 
schooling of the farmers is 5.6 years. Both these figures are typical for this type of irrigation schemes 
in the South African context, as is the average irrigation plot size of 1.2 ha. 
 
All schemes in the sample are irrigated by surface irrigation, which is the prevailing method at 
smallholder schemes. In the Mafefe region most farmers only cultivate their irrigated land during the 
wet summer season, with maize as the most important crop. Around Trichardtsdal production is more 
diversified. Most farmers also produce maize in summer, but they produce a wide variety of crops in 
winter. Spinach, beans, beetroots, cabbages and tomatoes are the most important winter crops in this 
region. The income share from irrigated agriculture ranges between 1% and 100% with an average of 
29%. The two most important income sources for the households in the sample are pensions and child 
grants. Also consistent with the other studies on smallholder irrigators is the finding that production is 
mainly for household consumption. The average degree of commercialization, calculated as the value 
share of production that is marketed, is 38% in this study.  
 
Farmers were also questioned about the occurrence of water shortages. Figure 4 presents the degree 
of water shortage. A large majority of the farmers reported that water shortages are sometimes 
occurring. It has to be noted however that in the winter season (= dry season) 37% of the farmers 
reduces their cultivated area, and about the same percentage does not produce. The main reason 
mentioned for this conduct is lack of sufficient water supply, suggesting that for full utilization of the 
irrigated area, occurrence of water shortage would probably be significantly higher. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally the trust of respondents in water management institutions was monitored. The question format 
applied in the World Values Survey to measure trust in organizations was used for this purpose 
(World Values Survey, 2006). The farmers had to indicate on a four-point scale how much 
confidence they have in the functioning of each institution. Figure 5 provides insight in the trust in 
the Catchment Management Agency (CMA) and the Department of Water Affairs (DWAF). 
Notwithstanding the fact that it is a higher-level institution, trust in the functioning of the DWAF is 
higher than that in the functioning of the CMA. An explanation for this can be that respondents are 
still less familiar with the CMA and its tasks because it is a new institution created very recently in 
the context of the 1998 Water Act and because in the Olifants catchment, where both study sites are 
located, the CMA is still not fully operational. That smallholders are unaware about how the water 
management institutions work and what their responsibilities are was also reported by Waalewijn et 
al. (2005) and Orne-Gliemann (2008). 
Rank ordered logit results  
The results of the rank ordered logit models were obtained using the statistical package STATA 
version 9. Following the recommendations of Holmes and Adamowicz (2003) the two qualitative 
attributes shown in table 1 were effect coded. When using effect coding, a reference level is assigned 
code –1. For the quality of title dimension “non-guaranteed supply” was chosen as reference level, 
while for the transferability the reference level was “no possibility to transfer”. In effects coding the 
utility of the reference level equals the negative of the sum of the other estimated coefficients, while 
the other levels take the utilities associated with their coefficient.  
 
Table 3 presents the rank ordered logit estimates for two different model specifications. The first 
model represents the most basic attribute specification. All the coefficients are significantly different 
from zero at the 95% significance level, meaning that they all are significant determinants of choice. 
The signs of the attribute parameters are as expected. Guarantee of water supply, increased duration 
of the license and improvements in transferability all increased the probability that an option was 
chosen. Oppositely, a higher water price decreased the choice probability. This is in line with 
economic theory.  
 
Model 2 introduces respondent specific variables into the indirect utility function. To arrive at this 
model we tested several interactions for which there were theoretical or empirical grounds and 
maintained those that were consistent throughout different model runs. Conform to the general 
expectations results indicate that the more commercially oriented farmers are, the more importance 
they attach to the possibility of market transfer. Several authors have described the role that water 
markets could play in addressing supply risk in regions with fluctuating water supply (Bjornlund 
2006, Calatrava and Garrido 2005; Hadjigeorgalis 2008). For South Africa, Pott et al. (2009) 
describe, based on interviews, how farmers mainly see markets as a way to ensure access to water 
supply. Obviously this is more important for the commercially oriented farmers than for the farmers 
who are more subsistence oriented and see irrigated agriculture as a way to supplement their diet.  
Respondents more dependent on irrigation for their income are more concerned about the quality of 
the title and are also more concerned about price increases. It is quite logical that the more one’s 
income depends on a certain resource, the more importance is attached to the quality of title for that 
resource. For these farmers the repercussions of insufficient supply are much higher. Moreover in the 
sample population higher irrigation income shares are usually correlated with lower and less 
diversified total incomes, a trend also reported by Yokwe (2009). This trend explains the significant 
interaction found between income share from irrigated agriculture and the price attribute. Another 
finding is that older respondents seem to attach less importance to price increases. Being more 
educated has a positive effect on the valuation of the duration of the license, but the effect on valuing 
quality of the title is opposite. The effect of the “education*duration” interaction term could have its 
origin in the often found positive relationship between education and investments in productivity. 
This relationship implies that better educated people are more inclined to make such investments, but 
as explained by Backeberg (2006) such investment decisions are negatively affected by a short 
duration of the licenses. A possible explanation for the interaction between education and quality of 
title is that the more educated people are, the more they consider themselves capable of dealing with 
non-guaranteed water supply by adjusting for instance cropping patterns. Cannon et al., (2003) for 
instance claim that better educated people can stimulate more mitigation choices to improve their 
circumstances. Furthermore the more educated farmers usually have supplementary income sources.  
As expected being more prone to water shortage increases concerns about quality of title. For farmers 
who never experience water shortage guaranteed supply obviously is less of an issue. Similar findings 
were reported by Alcon et al. (2008), Rigby et al. (2010) and Barton and Bergland (2010). Having 
more trust in the institutions responsible for water management finally decreases the importance 
attached to the duration of the license. It should be noted however that the “trust*duration” 
interaction was just not significant at a 90% level.            
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
  
A second major purpose of the CR experiment was to obtain the implicit values of marginal attribute 
changes. Table 4 presents the estimates of the implicit prices derived from model 2 for average 
respondents in terms of the individual specific characteristics. As expected these values are clearly 
lower than the productive value of water of 0.5 R/m³ estimated by Speelman et al. (2008b). 
Theoretically water transfers are expected to facilitate water reallocation from low to high valued 
uses at low cost, creating surpluses both for sellers and buyers (Brooks and Harris, 2008). Another 
potential advantage is that markets empower individual users to manage supply uncertainty 
incorporating decentralized information (Hadjigeorgalis, 2008). The WTP results indicate that in our 
study the opportunity to transfer water licenses is highly valued, but for the small-scale irrigators in 
the sample installing water markets as compared to a system of administrative transfer does not seem 
to add much value. Nevertheless Rosegrant et al. (1995), Shi (2006) and Donohew (2009) warned 
that over-regulation of water transfers will reduce their efficiency gains. An additional point that has 
to be considered here is to which extent water markets can decrease the administrative burden and 
associated costs of the currently proposed agency based transfer.  
High importance furthermore is attached to secured water supply. A similar result was also found by 
Alcon et al. (2008) and Rigby et al. (2010). They found that farmers would be willing to pay 
considerably more (up to 2 times more) for more certain water supply. In addition, the results suggest 
that increasing the review period of the licenses is an interesting intervention, since apart from the 
economic gain reported in table 6.4, this would certainly decrease administrative costs. This positive 
effect should be weighed against the loss in flexibility to adjust water policy when long-term licenses 
are in place. Hodgson (2006) discusses this trade-off in more detail.   
 
INSERT TABLE .4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Conclusions  
As competition for water grows across the globe, water users and water management organizations 
seek better institutional arrangements for coordinating use and resolving conflicts (Bruns et al., 
2005b; Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in Agriculture, 2007). Improved water 
rights are one option to increase water productivity, to raise benefits from existing and new 
investments in water use and enhance rural livelihoods. The estimation of how inefficient a current 
water rights system is or what the impact of different improvements could be, has so far received 
little attention in literature (Linde-Rahr, 2008).  
 This study demonstrates that contingent ranking (CR) is a promising tool to measure the effect of 
improving water rights along different dimensions. It is applied to the case of smallholder irrigators in 
South Africa. While this sector is considered important for poverty reduction in rural areas, it clearly 
struggles with problems of low water use efficiency and insufficient cost recovery. Taking into 
account this context it is highly relevant to evaluate the expected impact of water right reforms on 
this specific stakeholder. Overall the estimations of the WTP indicate that farmers experience 
significant inefficiencies in the current water rights system, with significant economic gains attached 
to the improvement of the water rights. Tackling these inefficiencies will not only be favorable for 
the efficiency of water use of smallholder irrigators, but given the size of the benefits, it can also add 
significantly to the government objective of cost recovery. With a higher WTP for water there is 
more room for government to increase water prices and reach a higher level of cost recovery. 
 
Policy makers can clearly use such results to guide water right reforms. Besides the information on 
the economic gains, it gives them direct information concerning the priorities of a target group. This 
knowledge can help government to increase support for the interventions. A limitation of the current 
study is that it focused on the average smallholder, while this actually is a quite heterogeneous 
population. In a second paper (Speelman et al., 2010) we therefore investigate in depth the 
heterogeneity in preferences along different population segments. Given the South African context it 
would in the future also be interesting to collect data from the large scale commercial farmers or from 
other water using sectors (mining, forestry) and to compare the results.        
 
Finally it should be stressed that when deciding on reforms the cost side should also be taken into 
account. While this study focuses on the farmers and how their transaction costs can be lowered by 
water rights reforms, Challen (2002) and McCann and Easter (2004) have stressed that there is also a 
cost of institutional change itself and of establishing and maintaining institutions. For government 
some reforms, like for instance the increase of the review period, might lower costs, while others will 
have a price tag attached to them. The analysis provided in this study should therefore be used as a 
part of a broader framework.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 Attributes and levels used in the choice sets  
Attributes Levels 
Transferability  not transferable agency based transfer market transfer 
Duration  5 year 10 year  
Quality of title guaranteed quantity quantity not guaranteed  
Price  0.06 R/m³ 0.09 R/m³ 0.12 R/m³ 
 
 Table 2 Definition of respondent specific variables included in the rank ordered logit model 
Name  Definition  Description  Mean 
(st.dev) 
Range 
com Degree of 
commercialization (%) 
Share of irrigated production 
marketed (in terms of value) 
38 (30) 0-100 
iryshare Income dependency on 
irrigation (%) 
Share of household income 
from irrigation 
29 (24) 1-100 
age Age of farmer 57.8 (13.2) 27-85 
edu Years of schooling of farmer 5.6 (4.5) 0-15 
insttrust Institutional trust  Summated score for trust in 
water management institutions. 
A four-point scale ranging 
from “no confidence at all” to 
“a great deal of confidence” 
was used to assess trust in the 
catchment management agency 
and the department of water 
affairs.  
  
short Frequency of water 
shortage 
Five point scale assessing 
frequency of occurrence of 
water shortage, ranging from 1 
“often” to 5 “never”  
  
 
 Table 3 Rank ordered logit results: determinants of ranking  
 Model 1 Model 2 
Attribute coefficient SE p-value coefficient SE p-value 
Duration 0.0957 0.0136 0.000 0.1152 0.0408 0.005 
Quality of title 0.6284 0.0382 0.000 1.1495 0.2850 0.000 
Price -0.0478 0.0147 0.001 -0.1746 0.0857 0.042 
Agency based transfer 0.2300 0.0496 0.000 0.2386 0.0487 0.000 
Market transfer 0.3598 0.0514 0.000 0.2157 0.0732 0.003 
Com*market transfer    0.3746 0.1527 0.014 
Iryshare*quality of title    0.8666 0.4306 0.044 
Iryshare*price    -0.1267 0.0698 0.069 
Age*price    0.0028 0.0013 0.036 
Edu*quality of title    -0.0577 0.0192 0.003 
Edu*duration    0.0064 0.0029 0.030 
Insttrust*duration    -0.0109 0.0068 0.111 
Short*quality of title    -0.1155 0.0656 0.079 
Model statistics       
LogL(initial)  -1277.58   -1277.58   
LogL(final) -1051.47   -1029.65   
Pseudo R² 0.177   0.194   
       
 
 Table 4 Valuation of attribute changes 
Attribute change  Implicit WTP 
No transfer to agency based transfer 14.6 c/m³ 
Agency based transfer to market transfer  2.4 c/m³ 
No secured supply to secured supply 12.6 c/m³ 
5 years to 10 years  9.7 c/m³ 
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